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Abstract
The Monty Hall Problem (MHP) has a counterintuitive solution, and people have the
propensity to stay with their initial selection even though switching has a higher
probability o f success. Surface and structural similarity in analogical reasoning was used
to investigate transfer from a card game to the MHP. Congruency between the number o f
cards and doors produced greater transfer to the MHP when the probabilities were salient.
Transfer from the card game to the MHP is based on surface similarity and a complete
transfer based on structural similarity is rare because of the difficulty in understanding
the conditional probabilities in both domains.
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Introduction
Analogies can be used as a means o f understanding new concepts or deriving
solutions to a novel problem. A person can learn about a new concept by conceptually
noting its relationship to existing knowledge. For instance, in teaching a new concept
such as the underlying mechanisms of the hydrogen atom, a person can draw an analogy
between molecular and solar systems in order to understand the processes involved in the
hydrogen atom (c.f. Gentner & Toupin, 1986). Applying an already learned concept to
understand a new one can facilitate a greater understanding o f a complex problem.
Analogies can be a useful tool in solving problems, interpreting information or situations.
The plan o f this paper is as follows. Firstly, there is a brief introduction to the
concept of analogical reasoning, especially pertaining to the surface and deep structural
components. Secondly, a counterintuitive problem, the Monty Hall Problem (MHP) is
described and how analogical reasoning can be applied to the MHP. Thirdly, three
experiments were conducted to investigate the role of analogical reasoning from one
domain (a card game) to the target problem (the MHP).
Theoretical Background of Analogical Reasoning
The use o f analogies involves the transfer o f knowledge from one context or
domain to another by generating knowledge from a source domain that can be applied to
a target domain (Chen, 1995; Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, &
Thagard, 1986; Holyoak & Koh, 1987; Sternberg, 1977). The novel domain is the target
whereas the knowledge from an already learned domain is considered the source. For
instance in the solar and hydrogen atom example, in order to understand the underlying
mechanisms involved, a person maps the elementary causal structures of the solar system
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(the sun is more massive than a planet and the planet revolves around the sun) to the
underlying causal structures in the hydrogen atom (the nucleus is more massive than an
electron and the electron revolves around the nucleus). There are four basic steps to
analogical problem solving: These processes are encoding, inference, mapping, and
application. Encoding requires identifying the attributes and values o f the source and the
target problem. Inference involves the selection of the source as a potential analog to the
target problem. Mapping requires the recognition between similar and different elements
of the source and the target. The application entails an extension o f the mapping to create
rules that can be applied to the target in order to achieve a solution (Chen, 1995; Holland
et al., 1986; Sternberg, 1977). These processes are essential in order for an analogy
between two domains to be drawn, although they need not follow a strict consecutive
order for transfer to occur (Holyoak & Koh, 1987). The foundation of analogical
reasoning is based on the use of existing knowledge to understand another domain. A
source analog that is stored in memory must be retrieved in order to apply it to the target.
Which source analog will be retrieved, depends on many factors such as its accessibility,
surface features, and structure.
Three processes guide analogies: These processes are similarity, structure, and
purpose. Similarity can be based on surface features or structural components. Surface
similarity refers to identifying two domains that have no causal role in determining
possible solution of an analog, and structural similarity identifies the elements that
influence the attainment of the solution (Holyoak & Koh, 1987; Holyoak & Thagard,
1989). Holyoak and Koh (1987) stated “in practice, however, the problem solver’s
ability to distinguish surface from structural features will almost inevitably be imperfect,
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since initial understanding of the unfamiliar target problem will be impoverished”
(p.334). Surface features may be used initially to draw the analogy, but the deep
structural components are necessary for successful transfer of the correct solution. Thus,
i

a novel problem that shares both surface and structural similarity with a source problem
may be retrieved and applied more often than a novel problem that shares dissimilar
surface, but similar deep structural elements. It is necessary that the problem solver
constructs a mapping between the source and target problem for transfer to occur.
However, mapping is not sufficient for transfer since a person can successfully map
between two domains, but may not be to adapt the solution from the source to the target
(Novick & Holyoak, 1991). The last process is the person’s goal or purpose for
considering the analogy (Holyoak &Thagard, 1995). That is, a person must apply the
appropriate solution to solve the novel problem.
The “General” and “Radiation” problems are commonly used to provide examples
of analogical transfer using a source analog to derive the correct solution to a target
problem. The “General” problem involves an army general who must decide on the best
strategy to attack a fortress given that he cannot attack the fortress via the main road. The
correct solution is for the general to send his troops from different roads to converge
simultaneously on the fortress. In the “Radiation” problem, a patient has a stomach
tumor and requires a strong ray to destroy the tumor, but the intensity of the dosage will
destroy the healthy surrounding tissue. The solution is analogous to the solution required
to solve the “General” problem: Use lower intensity doses simultaneously converging on
the tumor. The analog solution is derived less often spontaneously (20 percent) than
when people are provided with a hint to consider one of the problems that have read (92
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percent) to derive the solution to the Radiation problem (Gick & Holyoak, 1980). Thus,
the use o f a hint helps the person to search for a mapping to initiate immediately and
without the hint the person may search different domains that have fewer common
elements to link the source to the target analog (Holyoak & Thagard, 1989). Similarly, a
hint aided in the analogical transfer between previously exposed schematic pictures that
provide a solution to a specific problem (Chen, 1995). In analogical problem reasoning,
a hint increased transfer more than the non-hint situation. People do not always
spontaneously see the analogy, and may require explicit suggestion in order to retrieve
source information to generate the correct solution.
People rely on similarities and differences in the associated content both when
they retrieve potential analogies from memory and when mapping the retrieved solution
to the target problem (Bassok, 1996). The more dissimilar or incongruent the source and
target problem, the less transfer should occur. Another indication of a “successful
transfer o f learning generally involves overcoming contextual barriers”(Gick & Holyoak,
1980, p. 349). Hence, people must be able to see past the surface similarities and
dissimilarities to the structural similarities of the two domains in order to achieve the goal
of successful transfer of the deep structure from one domain to another.
For instance, the General and Radiation problem have similar structural
similarities, but very little surface similarity. The structural process focuses on the
consistent conceptual parallels between the roles of the source and target domains. The
conceptual similarity for the above problems consist o f an attacking strategy that must be
employed through the simultaneously converging o f the rays/troops on the target. Thus,
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the “General” solution is used a mechanism to elicit the correct solution to the
“Radiation” problem.
The Monty Hall Problem
The MHP is a hypothetical reasoning task that is especially difficult since the
mathematically correct solution is counterintuitive. The MHP is a game show scenario
with an honest host and a contestant. In the game, there are three doors. Behind one of
the doors is a valuable prize (a new car) and behind each of the other doors is an
undesirable prize (a goat). First, the game show contestant selects one o f three doors (e.g.
contestant selects door 1). Then the host opens one of the unselected doors to reveal that
the car is not behind that door (e.g. host opens door 2). After revealing the contents of a
door, the host asks the contestant whether she would like to stay with the initial selection
(doorl) or switch to the other unopened door (door 3). The answer seems simply obvious
that the probabilities of the prize are equal, but this is mathematically incorrect. The
probability that the prize is behind the initial selected door is still 1/3, and that the car is
behind the unopened door is now 2/3 (Bar-Hillel, 1989; Gillman, 1992).
The corrept response to the MHP is based on conditional probability, but there is a
tendency to believe that the door that has been opened is now eliminated so the
probabilities should be equal since there are two doors remaining. In 1990, Marilyn vos
Savant was asked to solve the MHP by one of her readers. She responded with the
correct solution that contestant should switch because after opening the door the
probabilities favor the unopened and unselected door. As a result of her response, she
received many letters from both readers and mathematicians informing her that she was
incorrect (vos Savant, 1996). Not only do people judge the probabilities as equal, but also
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they are highly confident o f their response (c.f. Falk, 1992). People rely to various
degrees on their intuitions when making decisions. A characteristic o f intuition is the
perseverance in being resistant to alternative arguments (Falk, 1992). In the MHP, the
correct solution is counter to a person’s intuition.
An interesting aspect o f the MHP is that although people judge the probabilities
as equal, they have the overwhelming propensity to stay with the initial selection. Given
that people believe that there is an equal chance of winning and losing, there should be an
equal distribution of people who select to stay or switch doors in the MHP. Yet, this does
not occur. It seems that once a person has committed to a certain door, it is more
compelling to stay with the first choice rather than switch.
Although switching is the mathematically correct solution in the MHP, it is rarely
selected. When the MHP was presented as a word problem, most participants (84-87
percent) overwhelmingly stayed with their initial selection (Granberg & Brown, 1995,
Platt & Watkins, 1997). Furthermore, when asked to determine the probability of
winning the prize after the host reveals a door, over 93 percent o f respondents select the
equal probability (50-50 conclusion) although they had correctly estimated that the initial
probability is 1/3 for the selected door (Platt & Watkins, 1997). Varying the number of
doors in the MHP to three, five or seven did not significantly impact the percentage of
switching responses (Granberg & Brown, 1995). Over 90 percent o f people remained
with their initial door selection. These findings indicate the remarkable propensity to stay
with the initial selected door.
In computer trials that simulated the MHP, success of utilizing the switching
strategy varied as a function of the amounts of points awarded for staying or switching
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and winning. Switching percentages across the last block of ten trials differed between
those who received one point (55percent), 2 points (73 percent), and 4 points (88 percent)
indicating a linear relationship between switching performance and point incentive
(Granberg & Brown, 1995). The researchers did not investigate whether learning to
switch in the computer simulations transferred to switching in the MHP word version. It
is a leap to assume that participants understood the switching strategy and would adopt it
in the MHP without testing to ensure that this would actually occur.
A Game Used as a Source for Analogical Reasoning to Solve M HP
A card game was created to simulate the probabilities in the MHP. The purpose
o f the game was to provide participants with a method to learn that switching is the best
strategy and about the probabilities associated with winning as a function of staying or
losing in the game. There were two versions o f the card game: a 3-card and 10-card
game. The rules are similar for both games. The 3-card game consisted of three cards (an
ace and two non-ace cards). The participant selected a card, then one non-ace card was
revealed, and then the participant decided to stay with the initial selected card or switch
to the other card (that had not been selected nor revealed). A similar design was
employed for the ten-card situation, except eight cards were revealed before the
participant indicated the preference to stay or switch. The goal of the game was for
participants to learn the switching strategy and probabilities o f the card game, so that they
were provided with a better opportunity for the transfer of this knowledge to the MHP.
The 3-card game is an analogous simulation of the actual MHP problem, and the
10-card game is slightly less analogous since it does not contain the same number f doors
nor does it simulate the exact actual MHP probabilities. Specifically, the 3-card game
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simulated the 33:66 (stay: switch) probabilities of the MHP and the 10-card game
simulates 10:90 (stay: switch) probabilities. The 10-card probabilities were easier to
discern because o f the salience of the number of cards being revealed. The concrete goal
of each card game is to learn to switch and to attain a greater winning percentage across
trials. Schemas about existing learned knowledge can serve as identifying retrieval cues
to access relevant source analogs (Holland et al., 1986). It is unlikely that most people
have a problem-solving schema for the correct solution in memory for the MHP because
most people respond with the incorrect equal probability solution. Consequently, learning
about the probabilities involved and the switching strategy in a card game may help
develop a retrieval analog to solve the MHP.
Experiment 1
An experiment was conducted to investigate whether surface and deep structural
similarity and between the number of cards and number o f doors facilitated greater
transference to the MHP. The experimental design consisted of number of cards in the
game (3 or 10), decision making choice constraint on card trials (free choice = a choice
for each trial or constrained choice = choice effective for 5 trials), and number of doors in
the MHP word problem (3 or 10-door version). The design was a 2x2x2 betweenparticipants design. A within-participants examination of the learning across card trials
was also examined.
H I: Switching learning curve performance would be different fo r 3-card and 10-card
players. Specifically, 10-card game players would begin switching more often
from the onset o f the game and maintained higher switching percentages across
all trials than the 3-card game players.
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The probabilities associated with switching in the 10-card game are more salient than for
the 3-card game. That is, once a player begins the 10-card game, it is much clearer that
staying is not the winning strategy since there is a 10 percent chance that the person will
select the ace initially: This does not assume that the player will understand why
switching is better.
Participants who selected to switch in the MHP are hereafter known as switchers
and those who selected to stay in the MHP are hereafter known as stickers.
H2: MHP stickers would have different strategies in the card game and would have
less positive reinforcement associated with switching than MHP switchers would
in the card game.
If the player in the card game selects to switch and is positively reinforced for switching
by winning more frequently, then the player would be more likely to transfer the
switching strategy to the MHP because o f prior success in the card game. Card game
players, who are not positively reinforced for switching as often, may not view switching
as advantageous and therefore would not select to switch in the MHP.
H3: Mapping between the card game and the MHP would be greatest when the cards
and doors are congruent (surface similarity), especially when the probabilities
are more salient.
Objects that are similar create better mapping, which results in mapped differences
becoming more explicit, so that mapping differences are more similar than unmapped
(Holyoak & Thagard, 1995). Thus, transfer o f the switching strategy from the card game
to the MHP would occur at a greater percentage when the number of cards and doors
were similar than the dissimilar. Particularly, the congruent surface similarity between
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the card game and MHP should increase switching for the 10-card (10-door) condition
more often than the 3-card (3-door) condition. Again, this is a function of the
probabilities being more salient in the 10-card version than the 3-card version. Also, it
was expected that the congruent number o f cards and doors would enhance the
percentage of participants who correctly identified the probabilities of switching and
winning in the MHP. The latter prediction entails the deep structural similarities between
the card game the MHP versions. In the card game, the surface features of the cards are
more salient than most problems that involve analogical reasoning where the surface
features are less salient (c.f. Holyoak & Koh, 1987). Thus, the surface features will have
a stronger impact on retrieving the correct solution to the MHP.
H4: In incongruent number o f cards and doors conditions, 10-card (3-door)
participants would transfer the switching strategy more often than by 3-card (10door) participants.
The prediction was based on the fact that the probabilities in the 10-card situation favor
switching and that 10-cards players were expected to experience positive reinforcement
(winning) for switching more often than the 3-card players would. These two conditions
were expected to generate less correct estimations o f the probability o f switching and
winning. Hence, people who are able to overcome the different context of the cards and
doors should be able to transfer the information to a greater degree than those who pay
more attention to differences o f contexts. Transfer fails because superficial aspects of
content remain associated with the solution and it outweighs the relevant aspects of the
structure of the solution. (Bassok, 1996). Consequently, participants who attribute
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winning and losing to superficial reasons (i.e. positioning of the cards) rather than the
probabilities would not transfer the switching strategy to the MHP.
H5: The choice constraint conditions in the card trials (free choice vs. constrained
choice) would encourage participants to think about the consequences o f staying
or switching in the game. Specifically, constrained choice participants would
gain greater insight into the stay or switch outcomes than those who have a
choice fo r each card trial would.
Constrained choice participants had the opportunity to view staying or switching
decisions for five trials and the outcome associated with the decision. By noting card
trial outcomes in blocks rather than separate trials, they would have an opportunity to
think about the consequences o f the stay or switch decision as well as use this knowledge
to decide a strategy for wining in future trials. The free choice participants would not
have the advantage o f associating the switch or win strategies in blocks and thus be less
likely to think of what is the best winning long-term strategy over all trials.
Method
Participants
Undergraduate students (N = 142) at the College o f William & Mary participated
in the experiment for course credit. Each condition had 18 participants except for 2
conditions that had only 17 participants. In order to have a baseline for switching
response in the MHP, 32 undergraduates (naive to the MHP) responded to one of two
versions MHP (3 or 10-door) without exposure to the practice card game.
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Materials
Playing cards were divided into sets containing 3 or 10 cards, and in each set there
was one ace (the “winning” card). A chart consisting of four-block grids was provided
for participants to record their wins and losses as a function o f switching and staying for
all card trials. There were two versions of a MHP word problem: the original 3-door
version and a 10-door version (see Appendix A for the original version).
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight conditions. Each
participant played 30 consecutive trials of either a 3-card or 10-card game. The
participants were instructed that the goal of the game was to select the ace on each trial.
In the 3-card game, the participant selected a card, and then the experimenter always
revealed a non-ace card. The experimenter offered the participant the opportunity to stay
with the initial card selection or switch to the other card that was not selected or turned
over. In addition, half of the participants were allowed to choose to stay or switch on each
trial and the other half had a constrained choice that was effective for 5 trial blocks.
Constrained choice was intended to permit the participant to use a long-term strategy and
to observe outcomes. After indicating the choice, the participant’s card was revealed.
Participants recorded their wins or losses due to staying or switching for each card trial
on the chart.
The 10-card game followed the same procedure, except 8 non-ace cards were
revealed. After completing all trials, participants answered either the 3-door or 10-door
MHP word problem.
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Results
Switching in the Card Game
The switching learning curve was assessed by analyzing blocks o f five trials in
the card game per participant. An ANOVA revealed a main effect for block trial F (5,
690) = 17.46,

p< .05. There was also a main effect for number of cards F (1, 138) =

68.51, p< .05. The main effects for choice constraint was not significant, F (1, 138) =
0.48, p > .05. Additionally, there were no significant interactions, except for cards by
choice, F (1, 138) = 5.59, p< .05. Figure 1 denotes the interaction and switching curve for
all card game conditions. Participants in the 10-card game were switching more than 3card participants, but the switching strategies were not consistent within the card groups
for the free and constrained choices.
An independent t-test was conducted on how often participants selected to switch
across the 30 trials in the card game. The analysis revealed a significant difference
between 3-card players (M = 12.94, SD = 6.27) and 10-card players (M = 21.61, SD =
6.41), t (140) = 8.15, p < .05. This significance is expected since the 10-card game favors
switching more than the 3-card game does. Furthermore, on average 3-card players won
8.76 times and 10-card players won 19.92 times when they selected to switch in the card
game whereas 3-card players won 6.21 times and 10-card players won 0.93 times when
they selected to stay in the card game. Thus, overall in the card game, switching was
reinforced with a greater likelihood o f winning than staying: This is consistent with the
MHP expected outcome.
In addition, a t-test was conducted on switching and winning reinforcement in the
card game between MHP stickers (M = 10.81, SD = 7.40) and MHP switchers

(M =
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17.37, SD 6.30) revealed a significant difference, t_(140) = 5.68, p < .05. The MHP
switchers were being reinforced slightly more often for switching in the game than MHP
stickers were. Switching learning curves for switchers and stickers are depicted in Figure
2. MHP switchers adopted more switching from the first trial block and across trial
blocks.
MHP Response
Slightly more participants selected to stay (n =72) than switch (n =70) in the
MHP. An ANOVA conducted on switching responses in the MHP revealed significant
main effects for cards and doors, Fs (1, 134) = 25.48 and 5.10, p< .05, respectively.
Overall, participants in the 3-card game switched 31% whereas 10-card game players
switched 69% of the time. On average, those who answered the 3-door MHP switched
41% compared to 58% for 10-door participants. There was not a significant main effect
for choice constraint, F (1, 134) = 3.81, g = .08. The interactions were not significant,
except for cards by doors, F_(l, 134) = 5.10, g_< .05. See Table 1 for switching responses
in the MHP as a function o f number of cards and doors. As expected, the 10-card (10door) participants were switching more often.
Probability Estimation
An ANOVA conducted on the participants’ mean estimation of the probability of
staying and winning in the MHP revealed a significant main effect for cards and doors, Fs
(1, 133) = 5.77 and 12.41, g< .05, respectively. In the cards main effect, 3-card
participants responded with a 50% probability compared to 43% for 10-card respondents
(see Table 2 for mean estimations across all experiments). For the doors main effect,
participants in the 3-door condition estimated the probability as 49% compared to 42% in
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the 10-door condition. There were no significant interactions or main effect o f choice.
One participant was excluded from the analysis because he did not respond with a
numerical value to the question.

,
i

Overall, three people generated the correct probability (66%) of switching and
winning in the 3-door MHP. Eleven people generated the correct probability (90%) for
the 10-dooor MHP (seven were in the constrained 10-card (10-door) and three in the free
10-card (10-door) conditions). Thus, participants are learning to switch without the full
understanding of the probabilities involved in the MHP. Table 3 represents the number
of people who correctly estimated the switching and winning probability in the 3-door
and 10-door MHP for all experiments.
Discussion
Overall, participants were able to increasingly learn to switch across card trials.
The switching learning curve was as predicted with the 10-card players switching more
often than 3-card players. Additionally, more 10-card players began switching at a higher
level and continued to switch across trial blocks than did the 3-card players. The
interaction o f cards by choice may be partially due to constrained 10-card participants
electing to stay rather than switch. For instance, in the constrained 10-card condition, six
people had achieved insight into the probabilities but decided to stay for two or more
blocks because it was more challenging and fun to try to get the ace on first selection. As
can be seen in Figure 2, switching strategies are different amongst MHP switchers and
stickers. Switchers are more likely to switch from the onset and continue to do so at a
higher rate than stickers. In addition, MHP stickers were positively reinforced less often
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than were MHP switchers in the card game. Reinforcement of switching and winning is
an important component involved in the transfer of the switching strategy to the MHP.
Surface similarity played an important role in transfer from the card game to the
MHP. Participants switched more often in the 10-door MHP than the 3-door MHP.
Additionally, switching in the MHP was greater for the 10-card game players than the 3card game players. These results were consistent with the hypothesis that the salient
probabilities o f the 10-card game should increase the switching response in the MHP and
provides support for the concept that the probabilities are more salient as the number of
cards or doors increases. The interaction of the cards by doors reflects the fact that the
10-card (10-door) condition had greater switching responses than the 3-card (3-door)
condition, but the 10-card (3-door) condition also produced more switching in the MHP
than the 3-card (3-door) condition. The percentage of MHP switching was greatest for the
10-card (10-door) situation that contains both surface and structural similarities. The 10card (3-door) situation contains less surface similarity because of the incongruity between
the number of cards and doors; however, the structural similarity of switching in the
game was transferred to some degree to the MHP. The surface and structural similarity
between the number o f cards and doors are more easily transferred when the probabilities
are more salient.
Deep structural similarity between the card game and the MHP did not facilitate
the generation of the correct response to the MHP switching and winning probability.
Very few participants generated the correct response to either the 3-door or 10-door
MHP. Interestingly, people are not achieving insight into the actual probabilities of the
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MHP: This suggests that part o f the reason that the MHP is particularly difficult is that
the conditional probabilities are not easily understood.
The choice constraint manipulation was not significantly effective in producing
greater transfer from the card game to the MHP. As can be seen in Figure 3, constrained
choice may have influenced switching from the 3-card game situations to the MHP, but
constrained choice was not as much of a factor for switching in the 10-card game
situations. Perhaps, constrained choice is somewhat helpful when the probabilities are
not very salient, but in salient probability situations there may be a greater likelihood of
noting the switching strategy across card trials regardless of choice.
Although, participants overwhelmingly selected the probabilities as being equal
in the MHP, they were switching more often if they have had success with switching and
winning in the card game. Thus, switching in the MHP is not contingent upon insight into
the probabilities of the game and/or the MHP. People were learning to switch in the MHP
regardless^if they understood the probabilities involved. The switching response in the
MHP by participants reflected partial transfer from the card game to the MHP that is
based on surface similarities, but not deep structural similarities.
Since participants were not fully comprehending the reason for switching in the
MHP, Experiment 2 was designed as a replication of Experiment 1using computer trials
to simulate the card game as well as the incorporation o f the manipulation o f a hint.
Previous research has demonstrated that the use of a hint is effective in the analogical
transfer o f the correct solution from the source to the target problem (Gick & Holyoak,
1983; Holyoak & Koh,1987; Novick & Holyoak, 1991). The explicit use o f a hint aided
participants to actively use the deep structural similarities as an analog between the
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source and target problem. A hint was incorporated in the next experiment to see if this
would allow participants to note the deep structural similarities between the card game
and the MHP. The hint was simply a reminder for participants to use the information that
they had learned in the computer card game trials to solve the MHP. Furthermore, the
hint was used to help facilitate explicit mapping of the card game to the problem that may
not have spontaneously occurred without the hint.
Experiment 2
The manipulation of a hint was investigated through a replication o f Experiment 1
using computer card trials. The use o f computer trials ensures that experimenter error is
not a factor, such as the player attributing the outcome of the game to the experimenter.
The aim of this experiment was to replicate the previous findings that similarity and
congruity between the number o f cards and doors played an important role in the
switching responses to the MHP. In addition, providing a hint condition increases the
likelihood of switching in the MHP since the analogy of the card game and the MHP was
made explicit. The experiment consisted of number of cards in computer card game (3 or
10), the use o f a hint (hint or no hint), and the MHP versions (3 or 10-door). The
experiment was a between-participants design.
H I: Switching would occur more often in the 10-card game than the 3-card game
since the probabilities associated with switching in the 10-card game favor
switching more than fo r the 3-card game. Also, MHP stickers would have
different strategies in the card game and would have less positive reinforcement
associated with switching than switchers would in the card game
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This prediction was consistent with the first two hypotheses in Experiment 1. In addition,
these hypotheses were supported in the previous experiment.
H2: Mapping between the card game and the MHP should be greatest when the cards
and doors are congruent (surface similarity) and the hint was employed
especially when the probabilities are more salient.
Particularly, the congruent surface similarity between the card game and MHP should
increase switching for the 10-card (10-door) condition more often than the 3-card (3door) condition. In addition, switching would increase in the 3-card (3-door) condition
with a hint since it has both surface and structural similarity than the non-hint condition.
H3: Incongruent number o f cards and doors conditions, the switching strategy would
be transferred more often in the 10-card (3-door) hint condition than the 3-card
(10-door) hint condition. Overall, the hint condition would increase switching
across all conditions.
The use o f the hint would allow participants to pay attention to features of the card game
that go beyond surface similarity. Noting features other than surface similarity is
especially important when the surface features are dissimilar. The prediction regarding
the 10-card (3-door) condition is consist with the fourth hypothesis in Experiment land
the results of the study supported the prediction.
A post-game questionnaire was created to assess the degree to which participants felt
that the computer game was fair, if strategies were used, and to what degree the
participant attributed his performance in the card game to be within his control versus
based on luck.
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H4: 3-card players w ouldfind the game more fa ir than 10-card players, but 10-card
players would use strategies more often in the game and would fee l that they had
more control in the game than 3-cardplayers.
The reason for this prediction is that 10-card players may attribute the game as being
rigged because o f the greater switching and winning outcome if they do not understand
the probabilities involved in the game. Furthermore, 3-card players would not employ
the use o f a strategy consistently across the game and would attribute their performance
in the game to be based more often on luck than control.
An additional questionnaire was designed to assess decision-making processes in
order to establish if there was an affective component to staying in the MHP. Of
particular interest was the statement “I would feel worse if I changed my mind and was
wrong than if I stayed with my initial choice and was wrong”.
H5: Stickers would agree that they would indeed feel worse i f the above statement
was true more often than switchers would.
Perhaps, part of the decision to stay or switch in the MHP is based on the emotions
involved with losing. Granberg and Brown (1995) suggest that the reason that people
stay in the MHP involves a mental simulation of how the person would feel if they had
switched and lost versus stayed and lost.
Method
Participants
Introductory Psychology students (N = 144) at the College of William & Mary
participated in the experiment. Each condition had 18 participants. All participants
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received credit and fulfilled a partial requirement for their Introduction to Psychology
class.
Materials

,
i

The card game used in pilot study was programmed onto a computer using
Microsoft Visual Basic 6.0 programming software. The program was designed to
simulate the actual probabilities of each game: 33:66 (stay: switch) in the 3-card game
and 10:90 (stay: switch) in the 10-card game. The program was designed to generate a
random card position assignment to ensure that there was no superficial effect due to the
position of the cards in the game. The card game consisted o f either 3 or 10 cards. In
the 3-card game, there are three cards that are presented faced down on the screen. The
participant selected a card by clicking the box that corresponds to the card. A message
box appears indicating the card that the participant has selected. The participant’s card
was not revealed. Instead, another card was revealed to indicate that it is not the ace.
The 10-card game was similar except eight cards were revealed. After revealing the
card(s), the participant made a decision to stay with the initial selected card or switch to
the remaining card that was not revealed or selected by the participant. After the
selection, the participant received feedback as to whether they won or lost depending if
they stayed or switched. The participant was in control of each trial and only received the
feedback that was consistent with his card selection and decision to stay or switch. In
addition, there was a 4-block grid char for each person to record his performance on the
game across all 30 trials. A 3 or 10-door word version o f the MHP followed the card
game. Two questionnaires were administered after completion o f the MHP. One
questionnaire (see Appendix B) assessed the affective component of switching and
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losing. The statement o f interest was imbedded within the 20 statements. A second
questionnaire (see Appendix C) was designed to assess how each participant viewed the
fairness o f the game, any strategies that were employed in the game, and to what degree
the person thought that his performance in the game was based on luck. All questions in
both questionnaires were assessed on a 1 to 5 scale.
Procedure
All participants were randomly assigned to one of eight possible conditions.
Participants were tested in groups o f 2 to 4. Four computers were set up with the card
game. As soon as the participant arrived, they were seated at a computer terminal and
were given general instructions on how to play the game and how to record their
performance on a 4-block table. Participants were instructed that the goal of the game is
to produce a strategy that will result in the greatest number of wins (selecting the ace).
The game consisted o f 30 card trials and one practice trial. After the game was
completed, all participants completed the MHP word problem. They received one of four
versions o f the problem that contained either a hint that they may use the card game in
deriving their answer to the MHP or no hint, and either 3 or 10-door MHP. Afterwards,
ail participants received a short questionnaire assessing their views o f the game and
decision making processes.
Results
Switching in Computer Game
A t-test was conducted on how often participants selected to switch across the 30
trials in the card game. The analysis revealed a significant difference between 3-card
players (M = 14.97, SD = 5.99) and 10-card players (M = 24.01, SD = 4.09), t (142) =

10.575, p < .05. This significance was expected since the 10-card game favors switching
more than the 3-card game. Furthermore, on average 3-card players won 9.72 times and
10-card players won 21.44 times when they selected to switch in the card game whereas
3-card players won 4.97 times and 10-card players won 0.69 times when they selected to
stay in the card game. Thus, overall in the card game, switching is reinforced with a
greater likelihood o f winning than staying: This is consistent with the MHP outcomes. In
addition, a t-test was conducted on switching and winning reinforcement in the computer
game between MHP stickers

(M =

13.18, SD = 8.4) and MHP switchers (M =17.62, SD

6.37) revealed a significant difference, t_(120) = 3.59, p < .05. (The degrees o f freedom
for the last t-test were adjusted since equal variances were not assumed in the analysis).
The MHP switchers were being reinforced slightly more often for switching in the game
than the MHP stickers.
Post- Computer Game Questionnaire
Independent t-tests were conducted on the post-computer game questions. All
questions were based on a scale ranging from 1 to 5. For the question as to whether the
participants thought that the computer game was fair, there was no significant difference
between response for 3-card (M = 3.68, SD =1.11) and 10-card (M = 3.44, SD =1.27)
players, t_(140) = 1.20, p> .05. Overall, participants thought that the game was quite fair
but not completely fair. For the question o f whether participants followed any strategies
while playing the game, there was a significant difference between 3-card (M = 2.99, SD
=1.23) and 10-card

(M = 3.89, SD =1.15) players, t (141) = 4.56, p < .05.

The 10-card

participants were following some sort o f strategy more often than the 3-card participants
were. For the question of whether the participants believed that the game was based on
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luck or was within complete control, there was a significant difference between 3-card

(M = 2.50, SD =1.13) and

10-card

(M = 3.38, SD =1.25) players,

t (141) = 4.356, p

< .05. The 10-card players believed that the game was more within their control and was
less based on luck than the 3-card players.
MHP Response
Slightly more participants selected to switch (n = 78) than stay (n = 66) in the
MHP. An ANOVA conducted on the switching response of the MHP word problem
revealed a significant main effect for number of cards in the computer game, F (1, 136) =
5.83, p < .05. Overall, 3-card game (44%) participants switched less on the MHP word
problem than the 10-card game (64%). There were no significant main effects for the
hint condition and MHP word problem, Fs (1, 136) = 1.90, p > .05. Furthermore, the
only significant interaction was for number of cards in computer game by MHP word
problem, F (1, 136) = 4.20, p < .05. See Table 1 for mean switching responses for MHP
as a function o f number of cards by number of doors. Again, the most switching
occurred in the 10-card (10-door) condition. Figure 4 depicts the mean switching
responses across for all conditions.
Probability Estimation
An ANOVA conducted on the participants’ mean estimation of the probability of
staying and winning in the MHP revealed a significant main effect that was approaching
significance for MHP word problem, F (1, 134) = 3.91, p = .05. Overall, 3-door
participants indicated that the probability of winning the car as 50% whereas the 10-door
participants estimated the probability of winning as 46%. See Table 2 for comparison of
estimations across all experiments. The main effects for hint condition and computer
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game number o f cards were not significant, Fs (1, 134) < 1.0, p > .05. No interactions
were significant.
Only nine participants estimated the correct response for switching and winning
in the MHP. In the 3-door MHP, 1/72 (1-%) people correctly generated the 2/3
conclusion and 8/70 (11%) in the 10-door correctly generated the 9/10 conclusion. The
3-door person was in the 3-card hint condition. O f the 10-door people, four were in the
10-card no hint condition, three were in the 10-card hint condition, and one in the 3-card
no hint condition. Again, transfer is greater for congruent than incongruent cards and
doors. Table 3 depicts the number o f people who generated the correct probability
responses for the 3-door and 10-door MHP for all experiments.
Affect Associated with Switching
Finally, a t-test was conducted on the statement “I would feel worse if I changed
my mind and was wrong than if I stayed with my initial choice and was wrong”. A score
of 1 on the above statement corresponds to the response “exactly like me” and a score of
5 corresponds to the response “not at all like me”. There was no significant difference
between MHP stickers (M = 1.85, SD = 1.03) and MHP switchers (M = 1.66, SD = 0.95),
t (140) = 0.66, e> .05.
Discussion
The card game manipulation check worked since players were reinforced for
switching in the 10-card game more often than in the 3-card game and this outcome was
expected. Although, there was a difference in the positive reinforcement attributed to
switching in the card game for switchers and stickers. MHP switchers received slightly
more instances o f positive reinforcement for switching than MHP stickers. Again, this
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result is consistent with the pilot study. On average, MHP stickers and switchers adopted
different learning patterns for the card game and this may have further influenced their
decision to stay or switch in the game. Although, this is not the only factor, for there
were clear instances in which players adopted a switch and win strategy in the game, but
selected to stay in the MHP.
Slightly more participants switched in the computer card game than in the pilot
study. Surface similarity in the 3-card game had a more pronounced effect in transfer
from the card game to the MHP. More participants were switching in the 3-card (3door) and 3-card (10-door) conditions than they had in the pilot study (see Table 1). The
improved performance may be attributed to participants feeling more in control of the
game than in the situation where an experimenter was shuffling and revealing the cards.
However, 10-card (3-door) participants in the computer game were similar to the same
condition in the pilot study. There was a slight decrease in 10-card (10-door) switching
responses in the computer card game from the pilot study. This may be the result of the
constrained choice manipulation. Although, the choice manipulation was not significant
in the previous study, it did seem to affect 10-card participants more in terms of
understanding the probabilities involved in the card game.
For the mean estimation of the probability to stay and win, almost all MHP
respondents were estimating the probability as being equal (although 10-door respondents
were selecting a slightly lower probability). Nonetheless, these estimations do not come
near the correct estimation. These results support the notion that surface features are
influencing the participants’ decision to stay or switch in the MHP, but they do not truly
understand the causal relationship (the probabilities) associated with switching. The deep
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structure characteristics were not fully transferred to the MHP for most participants.
Once again, very few people estimated the correct probability for switching and winning
in the MHP (see Table 2 for comparison between pilot study and experiment 1).
!

In addition, MHP stickers did not differ from MHP switchers on the statement
that they would feel worse if they had switched and lost than stayed with an initial
decision and lost. Both agreed that this statement did reflect their beliefs, but it is
surprising that the MHP switchers agreed slightly more with the statement. Perhaps, the
reinforcement on the card game was interacting with the response to the statement.
The failure of hint across conditions was most likely due to the inability to
understand the probabilities associated with the MHP. However, it should be noted that
the hint seemed to be most effective in the 10-card (3-door) conditions. This situation
was consistent with the concept of a hint providing the necessary link for mapping when
there is surface incongruity. Previous studies (e.g. Gick & Holyoak, 1980) that had
employed the use o f a hint, also had the correct solution explicitly stated in the source
problem. In the card game, the correct solution was never explicitly stated to the
participants. Each participant experienced different outcomes in the card game that were
based on card selections and decisions to stay or switch. Participants were reinforced at
different rates in their card game experience. Consequently, providing a fixed outcome
to the card game may possibly influence people’s propensity to stay in the MHP.
Experiment 3 involved manipulating the feedback in the card game to ascertain
how participants interpret the strategies or plans within the game and how positive and
negative feedback influences switching responses to the MHP. Since surface more than
deep features are being transferred in the previous investigations, then manipulating the
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outcome of the card game would influence decisions to stay or switch in the MHP,
especially in the conditions where surface similarity between the number o f cards and
number of doors are congruent.
Experiment 3
Manipulating the outcome feedback for the card game should impact decision
making and responses derived to the MHP. For instance, always switching or staying in
the card game and noting the win/loss outcomes should eventually affect the decision
processes of the person. The person at some point in time may be convinced that the
game is biased (Rachlin, 1989). Even if a person believes the probabilities to be equal,
he should eventually suspect that the game is biased when one outcome consistently
occurs. If the outcome of the game is consistent with a person’s expectations, then the
person may be less likely to notice the bias. Also, if the person is mapping surface
features and not the deep structural features between the card game and the MHP, then
the person would not necessarily perceive the card game as biased. How does exposure
to the false outcome feedback influence the decision in the MHP? Does switching and
winning facilitate a greater switching response in the MHP or will people select to stay
i

with the initial selection? That is, providing participants with a fixed game outcome
situation should enhance surface similarity between the card game and the MHP.
Experiment 3 explored how manipulating card trial outcome in the scenario design
influenced the decision to stay or win the MHP. The experimental design consisted
number of cards in the game (3 or 10), hypothetical player decision in the game (stay or
switch cards), win/loss outcome o f the game (win or lose 90% o f the time), and the
version of the MHP (a 3 or 10-door version).
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The following predictions were based on participants’ actions in the previous
studies described above where there was the tendency to rely on surface features when
deciding to stay or switch in the MHP. Note that there were only 2 conditions in which
the outcome feedback was not false: 10-card switch and win and 10-card stay and lose.
H I: Switching in the MHP would occur most often in the switch and win and stay and
lose conditions.
These conditions reinforced and primed participants that switching would lead to
a better success ratio in the card game. Within these conditions, switching would be the
greatest for the 10-card (10-door) situation since surface similarity would be congruent.
Because the outcome feedback positively reinforced switching, the expected MHP
response was for switching to occur at higher rates in the 3-card (3-door) situation, but
less often than the 10-card (10-door) situation.
H2: The switch and lose and stay and win conditions would generate the lowest
amount o f switching in the MHP.
Since participants did not view a switching reinforcement in the game, the surface
similarities between the game and the MHP would promote staying in the MHP.
H3: Participants in the incongruent surface similarity conditions would be less
influenced by the outcome feedback o f the card game.
That is, in the conditions that reinforced switching, there would be more switching in the
10-card (3-dooor) situation than the 3-card (10-door) situation, but switching would be
less than the congruent surface similarity situations between the card game and the MHP.
A reverse pattern would occur in the conditions in which switching was not reinforced in
the card game.
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H4: MHP estimations would not differ across conditions since the deep structural
features o f the card game would not be transferred to the MHP when the
participant was not in control o f the game.
If participants do not have the opportunity to learn about the structural similarity between
the card game and the MHP from their own experience and performance, then they will
not achieve the correct estimation, and they will rely on the equal probability solution.
H5: Stickers would agree more with the statement offeeling worse i f they had
switched and lost than stayed and lost than switchers would.
Although, the above statement was not significantly different in Experiment 2, it was
predicted that the lack of control over the card game would not influence responding to
the statement.
Method
Participants
Introductory Psychology students (N = 259) at the College of William & Mary
participated in the experiment for credit towards partial fulfillment for course
requirements. There were 15-18 participants in each condition with 11 conditions
consisting of 16 people.
Materials
Participants viewed a card game scenario that was placed on 3x5 index cards.
Each index card contained a game that already occurred between a dealer and a player
with the information about the player’s decision and outcome. The index cards had either
a 3 or 10-card game scenario. The participants viewed 30 index cards. In the game, the
player always made one of two decisions: to switch to the other card for all 30 trials or to
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stay with the initial card for all 10 trials. The outcome o f the game was manipulated so
that the player either won or lost 90% o f the time. In addition, participants completed
either a 3 or 10-door MHP word problem.
Procedure
Participants were randomly selected to complete one o f sixteen conditions. All
participants viewed a 3 or 10-card version of one o f four index card scenarios (switch and
win, switch and lose, stay and win or stay and lose). After viewing the 30 index cards,
participants completed a 3 or 10-door version of the MHP.
Results
MHP Response
A greater number o f participants selected to stay (n = 176) than switch (n = 83) in
the MHP. An ANOVA on the MHP switching response revealed a significant interaction
for player decision by win/lose outcome, F (I, 243) = 49.09, p< .05. Overall, those
exposed to the switch and win situation switched 51% in the MHP word problems
compared to 50% in the stay and lose situation, 18% in the switch and lose, and 9% in the
stay and win situation. Thus, the surface manipulation worked in which people learned to
switch more often for conditions that reinforced switching (switch and win, stay and
lose).
A significant interaction occurred between player stay/switch decision by number
of cards in game, F (1, 243) = 5.81, p < .05. Overall, those exposed to the switch 10-card
situation switched 32% o f the time in the MHP compared to 37% in the switch 3 card
situation, 40% in the stay 10-card situation, and 19% in the stay 3-card situation.
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There was a significant interaction for index card number by MHP word problem,
F (1, 243) = 4.78, p < .05. Overall, the 10-card (10-door) condition switched more often
than the other conditions, although this was less than previous studies (see Table 1).
Again, this supports the hypothesis that the switching outcome for the 10-card and 10door problem is more salient and increases transfer. Also, it is interesting that the
congruent 3-card (3-door) situation produces slightly more switching than the
incongruent conditions in this experiment.
Finally, the last significant interaction was a four-way interaction for player
decision by card number by outcome by MHP, F (1, 243) = 5.22, p < .05. Figure 5
depicts the mean switching responses for all conditions. Several situations were
influencing the four-way interaction. The 10-card (3-door) were not consistent with the
hypothesized predictions. In the switch and win condition, switching in the MHP was the
lower whereas in the switch and lose condition switching was the higher than anticipated.
Furthermore, the 3-card (3-door) situation in the switch and win condition was slightly
higher than the 10-card (10-door) situation in the same condition. There was not a
consistent pattern of switching or staying in the MHP across card and door conditions.
There were no significant main effects for player decision, cards, outcome, and
MHP, Fs (1, 243) = 0.91, 2.39, 0.56, and 1.33, p> .05, respectively.
Probability Estimation
An ANOVA on the participants’ mean estimation of the probability of staying and
winning in the MHP word problems revealed a significant main effect for number of
cards, F (1, 239) = 6.20, p < .05. Overall, those exposed to the 10-card game estimated
the probability of staying and winning as 46% and those in the 3-card game estimated a
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49% chance of winning. Neither is close to the correct response that is 10% for the 10card game and 33% for the 3-card game. Four participants (2 in 3-door and 2 in 10-door
MHP) were excluded from the probability estimation analysis because they did not make
i

any numerical estimation. No other main effects or interactions were significant. A gain,.
see Table 2 for mean estimations for all experiments.
Several participants did correctly estimate the switching and winning probabilities
o f the MHP. For those who had the 10-door MHP, 10/126 (8%) correctly generated the
90 % switch response. O f the ten participants who generated the correct solution to the
10-door MHP, four were in the 10-card stay and win condition, three in the 10-card stay
and lose condition, one in the 10-card stay and win, one in the 10-card switch and lose;
and one in the 3-card switch and win condition. Only 5/129 (4%) correctly generated the
66% response. O f the five participants who generated the correct response to the 3-door
MHP, two were in the 3-card switch and win, two were in the 10-card switch and lose,
and one was in the 3-card stay and lose conditions. See Table 3 for number of
participants who generated the correct responses in all the experiments. The above
descriptive statistics support the difficulty o f generating the correct solution in the MHP.
It is surprising that there were 3-card people who generated the correct response since the
false outcome feedback did not generate the 33:66 probabilities. Furthermore, it is
interesting that there were seven people who were in the conditions in which the feedback
favored staying (switch and lose and the stay and win) and overcome the false feedback
and generated the correct response.
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Affect Associated with Switching
Finally, a t-test was conducted on the statement “I would feel worse if I changed
my mind and was wrong than if I stayed with my initial Choice and was wrong”. The
analysis revealed a significant difference between MHP stickers (M = 1.67, SD = 0.87)
and MHP switchers (M = 2.29, SD = 1.22), t (257) = 4.69, p< .05. A score of 1 on the
above statement corresponds to the response “exactly like me” and a score of 5
corresponds to the response “not at all like me”. More MHP stickers perceived the
statement to reflect their beliefs significantly more than the MHP switchers did despite
the fact that most agree to the above statement.
Discussion
The switch/stay and win/lose outcome feedback manipulation significantly
affected the MHP responses. Overall, participants switched more often in the MHP after
being exposed to the index card game with a switch and win or stay and lose condition.
In these conditions, surface similarity played a role in transfer o f switching to the MHP.
People are viewing cards and are primed to switch by the card outcome feedback
manipulation without regard to the deep structural aspects of actual probabilities involved
in staying and switching. This reinforces the fact that learning to switch in the MHP is
due to surface similarities without regard for the deep structural similarities between the
card game and the MHP. Similarly, the switch and lose and stay and win conditions
resulted in the greater surface similarity transfer to stay in the MHP.
It is difficult to explain the inconsistencies in the 10-card (3-door) situations
across index card outcomes, especially in regard to the switch and win condition. The
low switching rate in the latter condition was unexpected.

Also, it is interesting that the
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3-card (3-door) situation had a greater switching percentage in the switch and win
condition, and this was slightly higher that the 10-card (10-door) situation. The switch
and win condition produced the best mapping of congruent surface similarities between
the card game and the MHP.
The MHP probability estimations were close to the equal probability solution and
fewer people correctly estimated the correct probability o f switching and winning in the
MHP. These results are consistent with the predictions proposed for this experiment that
people would be less likely to deviate from the equal probability estimation. Since
structural features were not playing a major role in transfer, participants may have based
their estimations on their intuition that opened door was no longer a factor and that the
probabilities were then equal.
The affect statement associated with the feeling worse with switching and losing
than staying and losing was significantly different for switchers and stickers. It is
important to note that overall most people agree with this statement. The emotional
component o f losing may play a role in the transfer o f surface and deep structural features
in the analogical reasoning by inhibiting people to look beyond the surface similarity and
probe into the structural similarity.
General Discussion
The overall findings indicate that deep structural analogical transfer is difficult in
the MHP. Surface similarity plays a greater role in influencing participants to switch in
the MHP after exposure to a card game, especially in salient probability conditions.
Participants learn the switching strategy in the card game and some adopt this strategy to
the MHP, but they do not seem to be able to correctly discern the probabilities associated
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with switching either in the game or in the MHP. A few participants did correctly
estimate the probabilities in the MHP, but these individuals were a minority. There is
more to deciding to stay or switch in the MHP than simply understanding probabilities;
learning experience plays an integral role as well as previous beliefs about expected
probabilities. Even when the learning is counter to the actual probabilities involved (e.g.
Experiment 3); participants learn a switching strategy superficially and apply directly to
the MHP.
A few participants realized that their probabilities were lower if they stayed with
their initial selection, yet they decided to stay rather than switch. Why do people stay
even when they know that it is better to switch? One explanation can be a result of the
intellectual investment attributed to the first decision. Perhaps, they felt that there was a
reason for their first selection (intuition, implicit), therefore it overrides the explicit
probabilities. “Even when people have no good reason for initial selection, having acted
on it, they become psychologically bound or committed to it” (Granberg & Brown, 1995,
p. 721). People tend to stick with their previous beliefs and rely on intuitions when
approached with an ambiguous decision. In reality, this is probably a reasonable
assumption and may have a high survival benefit. People do not have time to calculate
the probabilities involved, therefore they may rely on their intuitions about their
decisions, regardless of the initial randomness attributed to the first choice. Additionally,
it requires cognitive work to alter your first decision after having committed to the first
choice. People may employ a heuristic decision making approach in which they devote
little time to thinking about alternatives, especially if the outcome likelihood is perceived
to be equal (c.f. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
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Perhaps the reason for people to stay with the initial door may be due to affect. In
the MHP, part o f the decision process may entail a mental simulation of how it would
feel to stay and lose versus switch and lose. Granberg and Brown (1995) propose that the
MHP is a test o f counterfactual thinking, for there are more negative feelings associated
with losing after switching, then losing after sticking with the initial selection. They
further postulate that people stay in order to avoid negative affect reactions. In the
experiment, quite a few participants commented on their choice to stay in the MH was
due to their affect o f losing. For instance, one participant described the stay decision in
the MH “because it would stink if I switched and found out that I had the right one in the
first place”.
Investigations into counterfactual thinking have demonstrated that when two
events have equal outcomes, reactions to the situation that was closer to the goal elicits
stronger feelings than the situation perceived to be further away (Landman, 1988; Miller
& McFarland, 1987). In addition, people feel greater regret following an action that
resulted in an unfavorable outcome than an inaction (Landman, 1988). In the MHP, some
participants explicitly stated that they would prefer to stay and lose than to switch and
lose. To justify the outcome of an action, people will attribute greater value to a low
relevance prize associated with an action versus and inaction (Gilovich, Medvec, and
Chen 1992). This may explain why people have the overwhelming propensity to stay
with the initial selection in the MHP.
Some future considerations should entail waiting a period o f time (e.g. a few
days) between the source and the target problem to see if the switching response in the
MHP remains a factor o f learning in the source problem. Holyoak and Koh (1987)
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demonstrated that people were still able to generate the correct solution to the target
problem days after being exposed to the source problem. The counterintuitive nature of
the MHP will be less resistant to transfer after a prolonged period o f time.
Providing a source with an explicit solution about the probabilities involved in the
MHP may aid deep structural transfer from the card game to the MHP. However, Novick
and Holyoak (1991) demonstrated that adaptation o f the source solution to the target
problem is difficult with math word problems. Perhaps, teaching participants a crash
course in Bayesian theory before giving them the card game and MHP may help people
to map and apply the deep structural similarities between these two domains.
In addition, participants may not be motivated to learn the switching strategy in
the card game and may require a payoff as an incentive. Granberg and Brown (1995) did
provide participants with a $25 payoff; nonetheless, switching performance did not
improve substantially. One could argue that the participants would need a larger payoff
as an incentive, but the payoff may cloud the participants’ thinking o f the game.
Specifically, the participants may not try to interpret the switching strategy as based on
conditional probabilities but one that works in the particular card game. Thus, when
given the opportunity to respond to the MHP the surface similarity of the game will be
transferred and not the structural similarity since the problem has not effect on the payoff.
Lastly, the false outcome feedback design in Experiment 3 should be investigated
using computer card trials. Instead o f programming the card game for the actual
probability associated with the game, the incorrect (90 percent win/lose and stay/switch)
outcomes would be used. In this manner, the salience of the participants’ performance
will be an important factor in determining the extent to which participants rely on surface
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similarity between the card game and the MHP. O f particular interest, would be to see
what occurs when the participant’s trial outcome is inconsistent with the person’s
expected outcome. The inconsistency may provide an opportunity for participants to try
to determine the actual probabilities associated with the card game. If they were
successful, they could transfer this structural information to the MHP.
In conclusion, people are able to learn about different switching and staying
outcomes through a card game played by the individual or viewing a card game that has
already occurred. It is understandable that people do not readily think in terms of
conditional probability. Nonetheless, people are able to learn about how to use a
switching solution to a counterintuitive problem from prior experience. The MHP’s
solution is counterintuitive and that requires mental work and learning to achieve partial
insight to the problem. Transfer to the MHP is based on surface similarity between the
card game and the MHP. A complete transfer from the card game to the MHP is rare
since the structural similarity between the two domains is difficult to ascertain because of
the conditional probabilities that are involved in both domains.
The use o f analogies to solve problems or understand concepts can be a useful
too, but it can also lead the person astray. Experiment 3 revealed the surface features of
the card game influenced the transfer of the incorrect staying strategy. An analogy may
be an inappropriate method for deriving solutions when that analogy that is retrieved is
not the correct source or the incorrect solution was stored in memory. Thus, analogies
can be useful for problem solving, but one must also use caution in using analogies to
ensure the appropriate analogy is utilized.
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Appendix A

You are a contestant on a game show. An honest game-show host has randomly placed a
new car behind one o f three identical doors. There is a goat behind each o f the other
doors. Now you get to select a door.
What is the probability that the car is behind the door that you selected?

After you have selected your door, the host (who knows where the car is) opens up one of
the other two doors to show that the car is not behind that door. He will always show you
a door that has a goat behind it, and he will never open up your door.
You are now given the choice to stay with your initial door selection or to switch to the
other door that you did not select and the host did not open.
Would you like to
stay

or

_____ switch

Based on your decision to stay/switch, what is the probability that you will win the car?

Please briefly explain your answers below.

Have you ever seen or heard of this problem before?

If so, what do you remember about it?
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Appendix B
Please use the following scale to rate the statements that appear below
1
2
3
4
5
Exactly
Not At All
Like Me
Like Me
It is easy for me to make decisions about day to day experiences (i.e. what to wear, what to eat
etc.)
1
2
3
4
5
I never change my answers on multiple choice exams because I know that 1st choice is usually the best
one.
1
2
3
4
5
I enjoy playing games more when I win.
1
2
3
4
5
When I make a decision, I usually stick with it.
1
2
3
4
5
I am confident in my decisions and usually choose the best option.
1
2
3
4
5
It takes me a long time to reach decisions that involve important aspects o f my life (i.e. my major,
my friends)
1
2
3
4
5
I rely heavily on my instincts/intuition when making decisions.
1
2
3
4
5
I would feel worse if I changed my mind and was wrong than if I stayed with my initial choice
and was wrong.
1
2
3
4
5
I need to have overwhelming evidence presented before I change my mind on a decision that I
have made.
1
2
3
4
5
I am stubborn and stay with my decisions regardless of promising alternatives.
1
2
3
4
5
When I change my answers on multiple choice exams, I am usually wrong.
1
2
3
4
5
I have a hard time maki ng decisions.
1
2
3
4
5
I regret some of the bigger and important decisions that I have made in my life.
1
2
3
4
5
I am easily flustered when I am faced making decisions that will impact other people.
1
2
3
4
5
I feel that my luck influences my decisions.
1
2
3
4
5
I like to weigh all the options before making any decision no matter how small it may be.
1
2
3
4
5
I am not swayed by family/peer pressure when I am trying to make a decision.
1
2
3
4
5
I often second-guess myself after I have just made a decision.
1
2
3
4
5
I can usually make up my mind in a matter of minutes.
1
2
3
4
5
I change my mind easily.
1
2
3
4
5
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Appendix C
I developed the card game program. Do you think that the game was fair?
1
Not At all

2

3'

4

i

5
Very Fair

Briefly explain your response to the above question

Did you follow a consistent strategy in playing the card game?
1
Not At all

2

3

4

5
Completely

Briefly explain any strategies that you followed during the game

Do you feel that the card trial outcomes were based on luck rather than within your
control?
1
Extremely
Lucky

2

3
Equally Based on
Luck and Control

4

5
Completely
within Control

Do you have any training in probability theory?
Yes

No

If yes, please explain the extent and source of your training (i.e. specific course,
experiences etc.).

48
Table 1

Switching Percentages in the MHP for Cards by Doors

Experiment

Cards and Doors

Experiment 1

Experiment 2

Experiment 3

3-card (3-door)

31

47

31

3-card (10-door)

31

42

31

10-card (3-door)

52

50

27

10-card (10-door)

86

78
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Table 2

Participants’ Mean Estimation of the Stay and Win Probability (%) in the MHP
MHP

Experiment

3-door

10-door

Correct Probability

33

10

Experiment 1

50

42

Experiment 2

50

46

Experiment 3

48

47

50
Table 3

Number of Participants who Generated Correct Switching Probabilities
in the MHP Across Experiments

Experiment
MHP

Experiment 1

Experiment 2

Experiment 3

3-door

3 (n=71)

1 (n=70)

5 (n=129)

10-door

11 (n=71)

8 (n =70)

10 (n=129)
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Learning curves for switching across card trials for number o f cards by choice
constraint.
Figure 2. Switching learning curve for stickers and switchers in the MHP.
Figure 3. Mean switching response for 3 and 10-door MHP by choice constraint and
number o f cards.
Figure 4. Mean switching response for 3 and 10-door MHP by use o f hint and number of
cards in the computer card game.
Figure 5. Mean switching response for 3 and 10-door MHP by index card manipulation
of stay/switch player decisions and win/lose outcome.
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